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and increased cooperation and collaboration with other 
organizations including the European Consortia for 
Political Research (ECPR) and the ECSA-World group. 
 In other words – the next two years look to busy 
and challenging and I look forward to working together 
with both the EUSA Executive Committee and EUSA 
members in general as we head towards the 2013 
meeting in Baltimore.
-Amie Kreppel 
Message from Incoming Chair and Outgoing 
EUSA Review Editor 
 This issue of the EUSA Review marks the end of 
my two-year term as Editor as I transition to my new 
role as Chair of EUSA. I am happy to report that newly 
elected Executive Committee member Nicolas Jabko 
(Johns Hopkins University) will be taking over as of 
the Fall 2011 issue. In addition, another new Executive 
Committee member, Susanne Schmitt (University of 
Bremen) will be taking over the EUSA Review’s book 
review section. To facilitate the book review process 
there is now a new opportunity to sign up as a potential 
book reviewer on the EUSA homepage. We especially 
encourage junior scholars to submit their information, 
since we may be less aware of their interests and areas 
of expertise.
 The EUSA Executive Committee also includes two 
additional new members elected during the spring Mi-
chelle Egan (American University) and Mitchell Smith 
(University of Oklahoma) together with continuing 
members Adrienne Heritier (European University In-
stitute) and Berthold Rittberger (University of Munich). 
For a complete list of the current Executive Committee 
and their roles see the EUSA website.
 In addition to welcoming four new members to the 
Executive Committee, I am happy to be able to an-
nounce the launch of several new initiatives for EUSA. 
 Following a good deal of hard work from outgoing 
Executive Committee member Erik Jones (SAIS-Bo-
logna) has worked to build a collaborative relationship 
with the Brussels based EU policy magazine E!Sharp 
that will allow members of EUSA to submit short (500-
700 words) editorials to the online publication. Ad-
ditional details and instructions on how to submit are 
available at the EUSA website.
 We are also moving forward with the planned 
special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy 
(JEPP) incorporating some of the best papers pre-
sented at the 2011 EUSA meeting in Boston. Thanks 
to an agreement with JEPP the EUSA conference 
special issue should become a regular event linked to 
our conference. This will provide an excellent forum 
for showcasing the high caliber of EU related research 
presented during the conference. We expect this first 
special issue to be published in late 2011 or early 2012.
 Other ongoing initiatives include the development 
(in collaboration with the ‘Teaching the EU’ EUSA-
Section) of a special “Teaching the EU” workshop in 
conjunction with the 2013 EUSA conference (through 
a proposal to the EU Life Long Learning Programme) 
From the Chair
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EU as a Global Actor since Lisbon 
Guest Editor- Jolyon Howorth
 Jolyon Howorth is Jean Monnet Professor of Eu-
ropean Politics ad personam and Emeritus Professor 
of European Studies at the University of Bath (UK). 
He has been a Visiting Professor of Political Science 
at Yale since 2002. From 2008-13, he will be Visiting 
Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, 
dividing his teaching between the Political Science 
Department and the International Affairs Council.  He 
is a Senior Research Associate at the Institut Français 
des Relations Internationales (Paris), a Fellow of the 
Royal Society for the Arts (UK), Chevalier dans l’Ordre 
des Palmes Académiques (France), and Member of the 
Advisory Boards of the European Institute for Public Ad-
ministration (Netherlands), the Centre for the Study of 
Security and Diplomacy (UK), the Institute for Strategic 
Research (Paris) and the European Business School 
(London). He spent the spring semester 2010 on leave 
in Berlin serving as a Research Professor at the Kolleg 
Forschergruppe, Otto Suhr Institute (Freie Universität) 
and working on a book project on foreign and security 
policy in the EU.
 He has published extensively in the field of Europe-
an politics and history, especially security and defense 
policy and transatlantic relations - fourteen books and 
two hundred journal articles and chapters in books. Re-
cent books include: Security and Defence Policy in the 
European Union, Palgrave, 2007; Defending Europe: 
the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, 
Palgrave, 2003 (edited with John Keeler); European 
Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge? Paris, 
WEU-ISS, 2000. 
 
The European External Action 
Service and Smart Power
Mai’a Davis Cross
 On 1 December 2010, the EU inconspicuously 
launched the new European External Action Service 
(EEAS).  Much of the world was unaware that any-
thing had changed.  But despite its quiet beginnings, 
the EEAS is actually a major innovation in the field of 
diplomacy as the first supranational diplomatic service 
of its kind.  To be sure, it was not created from scratch. 
It builds upon the infrastructure of the 136 Commission 
delegations around the world that were already in place. 
But the powers of the new EU delegations are signifi-
cantly broader and more ambitious than the old Com-
mission delegations.  Rather than being responsible for 
enacting the policies of just one institution, the EEAS is 
charged with coordinating, shaping, and enacting the 
entire body of EU foreign policy, under the command 
of the EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton.  In 
this sense, rather than being an offshoot of just one EU 
institution, the EEAS is set to become the embodiment 
of common EU foreign policy, and is in the process of 
cultivating a distinctive institutional identity.1 
 Of all the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations, the EEAS 
most demonstrates the EU’s commitment to smart 
power.2  I define smart power as the strategic and 
simultaneous use of both hard and soft power.   The 
EEAS is still in its first year and it is too soon to know 
what role it will ultimately have, but its very existence is 
an important indication of the EU’s evolving approach 
to foreign policy.  From the 2003 Iraq war to the current 
Libya crisis, it is easy to point out the recent, high-profile 
episodes in which member states were not readily able 
to coordinate their foreign policies, but it would be a mis-
take to draw any conclusions from these events alone. 
As discussed below, from a longer-term perspective, the 
fact that Europeans were willing to launch an ambitious, 
new multinational diplomatic institution shows that they 
are taking smart power seriously.  This bodes well for the 
EU’s ability to be better prepared in the face of crises, 
and to become a more consistent foreign policy actor.
 What is smart power and how does the EEAS con-
tribute to it?  Joseph Nye has written extensively about 
different forms of power.  He defines hard power as 
coercive.  It is the ability of A to force B do something it 
would not otherwise do.  By contrast, soft power inspires 
attraction, the ability to make B want what A wants.  In 
order to recognize smart power, it is important to note 
that the tools of power do not necessarily correlate with 
either hard or soft power specifically.  That is, it would 
be wrong to assume that hard power is equated with 
military might and soft power with diplomacy.  Rather, 
military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural tools can 
all be used either to coerce or to attract.  For example, 
militaries used for humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
can be a source of attractive power, as can militaries 
that are efficient and well-run.  Similarly, diplomacy 
can be coercive, using the tools of sanctions, hard 
bargaining, or shaming.  But diplomacy is also the key 
instrument of engagement, persuasion, and mutual 
understanding.  Thus, a variety of different tools could 
be at work in crafting the strategic combination of hard 
and soft power.
 The launch of the EEAS reflects a European com-
mitment to smart power in a number of ways.  First, the 
EEAS is designed to bind the foreign policies of mem-
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ber states and EU institutions more closely together, 
facilitating better coordination of hard and soft power. 
This is of course key to achieving effective smart power. 
Member states have been the main purveyors of hard 
power, while the EU has been more of a source of soft 
power.  This is true both in response to unanticipated 
crises as well as in terms of policy emphases.  The EU 
has been reluctant to coerce (or to appear to coerce) 
because it is a multinational actor that is committed to 
institutional and legal processes that are transparent 
and voluntary.  Hard power tactics would go against 
its normative character.  Indeed, the EU resorts to 
hard power only to support its most important norms 
and values, such as to stop human rights violations or 
discourage authoritarian practices.  Typically, the EU 
draws upon its wealth of soft power.  Depending on the 
audience, the EU is attractive because of its democratic 
norms, model of regional integration, commitment to 
enlarging its membership, history of overcoming a 
violent past, and so on.
 By contrast, member states have tended to control 
the hard power side of foreign policy, to the extent that 
this is necessary, because it is much easier for them 
to act decisively and legitimately in ways that involve 
coercion.  When it comes down to it, statesmen still 
have the distinct authority to make difficult foreign 
policy decisions unilaterally and to implement them as 
quickly as they deem necessary.  Of course, member 
states also have a wealth of soft power resources at the 
same time, such as programs of educational exchange, 
cultural promotion, and public diplomacy.  The creation 
of the EEAS shows the political will to bring these vari-
ous tools of power together, and to set the stage for 
better coordination of both hard and soft foreign policy 
strategies.
 Second, the creation of the EEAS is “smart” be-
cause the EU is fundamentally a diplomatic actor.  This 
is where its real strength lies.  The primary way in which 
member states and EU institutions articulate their in-
terests in the international arena is through diplomacy. 
The common market, Schengen zone, justice and home 
affairs issues, enlargement, and so on, were all built on 
a strong process of internal diplomacy among member 
states.  High-level, professional diplomats based in 
Brussels push integration forward and translate new 
treaties into tangible policy.  By strengthening this hall-
mark of Europe – diplomacy – the EU capitalizes on 
what it does best.  Without exception, member states 
have put forward their best and most qualified ambas-
sadors to lead the new EU delegations, and at lower 
levels in the diplomatic hierarchy competition for EEAS 
postings has been fierce.  Given that the success of 
the EU delegations will rest in part on the people who 
populate them, there is reason to believe that all parties 
involved want to equip the EEAS to be a smart power 
actor.  Diplomats are well-positioned and professionally 
trained to use soft power consistently, and hard power 
when necessary.  By focusing on diplomacy as the tool 
for future EU foreign policy, and then endowing the new 
institution with the best and the brightest, Europeans 
have clearly shown a commitment to smart power.
 Third, the EEAS enables the member states to 
articulate their common voice more strongly.  In do-
ing so, it amplifies both hard and soft power.  Indeed, 
the oft-repeated goal of member states to  speak with 
one voice comes from an understanding that by act-
ing together, Europe is stronger.  Collectively, the 27 
member states have much at their disposal – over half 
a billion people, the largest economy in the world, the 
second-highest level of military spending globally, the 
largest contribution of foreign aid, transnational collabo-
ration in research and development, and so on.  For 
several decades now, member states have renewed 
and strengthened their goal to speak with one voice in 
foreign policy matters:  from the 1970 European Political 
Cooperation to the 1992 Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy to the 1998 European Security and Defense 
Policy.  Now in 2011, with the EEAS, Europeans have 
one of the largest diplomatic services in the world.  This 
new diplomatic body is distinctive in that it actually puts 
thousands of high-level foreign policy experts on the 
ground who will be able to judge first-hand how events 
impact EU interests and goals.  They will also be able 
to shape responses to these events, and to build strong 
relationships that they can draw upon when unexpected 
crises strike in the future.  This will serve to make both 
Europe’s hard and soft power more visible.
 In sum, the EEAS facilitates better coordination of 
hard and soft power, capitalizes on a successful tradi-
tion of professional diplomacy, and amplifies hard and 
soft power.  The potential for effective smart power 
clearly exists.  Of course, it is still up to the member 
states to decide what they will allow the EEAS to do, 
and how far it will go in its development.  Ashton has 
already faced the challenge of coordinating diverse 
member-state positions in the wake of several crises. 
The EEAS is ideally suited to exercise smart power, but 
it must still have a mandate to act.  Stronger leadership 
going forward is necessary so that member states are 
encouraged to see their diplomatic creation reach its 
potential.
 Naturally, the EEAS does not mean that member 
states will be able to speak with one voice all the time, 
but there are reasons to be optimistic.  The EU’s devel-
opment of its own internal diplomacy has shown that 
professional diplomats often find ways of proving their 
abilities on the job.  The Committee of Permanent Rep-
resentatives (Coreper), comprised of member states’ 
ambassadors to the EU, is an excellent example of this. 
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Coreper started out with a limited mandate to prepare 
Council meetings.  By many accounts, it has now 
grown into the central engine of EU integration.  This 
occurred in large part because of the initiative of these 
highly experienced ambassadors.  Could the EEAS also 
achieve this kind of authority and influence on the global 
stage?  This may be a more challenging proposition, 
but as already noted, it is off to a good start.  Moreover, 
the fact that European leaders launched this new entity 
in the first place shows a commitment to smart power. 
These leaders now have a stake in the outcome, and 
the right ingredients are in place for success.
Mai’a Davis Cross, University of Southern California
Endnotes
1 Richard Whitman, 2010. “Strengthening the EU’s External 
Representation: The Role of the European External Action 
Service,” European Parliament.
2  Smart power is typically defined as the effective combination 
of hard and soft power.  I purposefully seek to take effective-
ness out of the definition so that the concept can be more 
analytically useful, rather than just a policy concept. 
Principles and Values Underpinning 
EU Foreign and Security Policy in an 
emerging Multi-Polar World
 Jolyon Howorth
“What are we for, what do we believe, what are we 
prepared to do? Does Europe really have any collec-
tive sense of how it can and should stand up for the 
principles and ideas that (with US help) shaped our 
current destiny? Do we have in Europe any remain-
ing value-driven vision of the world?”
--- Chris Patten 
 
 The early pages and articles of the Lisbon Treaty 
are replete with references to the principles and values 
which guide the EU’s internal and external action.1  Ar-
ticle 10a states that:
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be 
guided by the principles which have inspired its own 
creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule 
of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for 
the principles of the United Nations Charter and inter-
national law.” 
 The repeated articulation of these grandiose prin-
ciples and values makes it very clear what the EU for-
mally considers to be the underlying normative frame-
work for its interaction with the rest of the world.  The 
problem, however, lies in the implementation of these 
high principles. There are two fundamental issues here. 
First, a distinction needs to be made between, on the 
one hand, the EU as a powerful institutional bargaining 
mechanism, where bargaining gains can be achieved 
through Europe’s sheer weight within negotiating frame-
works; and, on the other hand, situations in which the 
EU explicitly strives to deploy its principles and values 
in an endeavour to change third state behaviour. An 
example of the former case would be negotiations within 
the WTO; an example of the latter case would be sanc-
tions policy against a country like Belarus.  The second 
fundamental issue to be discussed is: what leverage 
does the EU actually enjoy with the rest of the world 
and how successful is it (or could it be) in promoting 
and having accepted by others its explicitly articulated 
values and interests?  
 The EU, some argue, derives its global influence 
directly from the fact that it is perceived by other actors 
as a “normative power” which has trail-blazed peace-
ful coexistence and cooperation among its member 
states, an attractive socio-economic “model” based 
on the welfare state and a multilateral, rules-based 
approach to international relations and interactions.2 
For one scholar, “the most important factor shaping 
the international role of the EU is not what it does or 
what it says, but what it is”.3   However, the EU should 
be wary of attempting to project itself as a paragon 
of global good citizenship. The notion that the EU is 
appreciated or valued around the world solely on the 
grounds that it is a “normative power” is an internally 
generated European self-image and is not supported 
by hard external evidence. The first serious study of 
global views of the European Union suggested that – 
contrary to this internal myth – the Union qua Union is 
not perceived as a “model” by other regional actors.4 
Other studies of the external image of the EU concur.5 
Moreover, the fact that the EU’s weight in international 
trade negotiations often allows it to influence the out-
come does not amount to the exercise of “normative 
power”. It is the result of standard bargaining within any 
institutional setting. However, if the EU were to succeed 
in delivering global public goods through the judicious 
deployment of a wide variety of policy instruments, it 
could yet emerge as an actor which succeeds in promot-
ing certain principles and values which the rest of the 
world might come to respect and admire. The challenge 
confronting the EU in the 21st century is that of striking 
the correct balance between the pursuit of these es-
sentially normative objectives and the selection of the 
approaches and instruments necessary for success.  
 The principal multilateral institutions of the post-
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1945 period, while still in business, are all beyond 
their sell-by date and badly in need of root-and-branch 
reform. Any reforms, to be effective, must reflect the 
new balances of a global order featuring rising powers 
purveying a new and different range of value systems. 
Such actors promote a different vision of the relation-
ship between the individual and society, between law 
and justice, between freedom and coercion, between 
savings and money, between investment and profit, 
between markets and regulation, between work and 
leisure, between traditional mores and personalised 
lifestyles, between human rights and states rights.  In 
short, they call into question many Western assump-
tions about the very existence of “universal values”. This 
presents a quadruple challenge to the EU in terms of 
intervention in global affairs. 
 At the first level, it requires a pragmatic approach 
to the coming challenges of institutional design. Sev-
eral academic theoreticians of Europe’s global role 
have argued that since the EU does not command the 
central power resources of a nation state, it cannot 
implement a traditional foreign policy characterised by 
interest-based bargaining and power struggling, but 
has gradually developed a “structural foreign policy” 
through which it attempts to “influence in an enduring 
and sustainable way the relatively permanent frame-
works within which states relate to each other”.6  Such 
theorists see the EU exerting significant influence over 
the anarchic international system theorised by realists 
and particularly by neo-realists, thereby “modifying the 
basic structural conditions” in which international rela-
tions takes place, and “leading to an environment more 
favourable to peace and the values of civilian powers”.7 
The key issue here is the extent to which the EU will 
prove successful in reaching a “global grand bargain” 
with the rising powers over the nature of the future 
international institutional framework.8
 At the second level, that of a principled foreign 
policy, on issues as diverse as climate change, food 
safety, the death penalty, environmental policy, the 
rights of children and women, landmines, sustainable 
development and democracy promotion, the EU has 
tried to adopt a principled position in international nego-
tiations. Yet it is important to keep a sense of perspec-
tive.  On climate change, “the rhetoric, the plethora of 
initiatives, directives, and interventions have not been 
matched by outcomes.”9   On development aid, it has 
been calculated that the cost to the Global South of the 
EU’s protectionist Common Agricultural Policy amounts 
to several times the value of all the European aid 
monies disbursed.  The EU roundly condemns torture 
but has been complicit in assisting the US policy of 
“extraordinary rendition”.10  The International Criminal 
Court and the Ottawa Treaty banning land-mines were 
non-EU initiatives.  The EU is still made up of member 
states who behave exactly as all states have behaved 
since the Treaty of Westphalia.  In evaluating the EU’s 
commitment to hard and fast values and principles in 
foreign policy, elements of hypocrisy and double stan-
dards are legion. The EU has made some significant 
effort to develop a “principled foreign policy” but it still 
has a very long way to go.
  At the third level, it requires a sophisticated ap-
proach to values-competition.  How should the EU deal 
with global actors who do not share its vision of “uni-
versal” human rights?   The Union promotes a strong 
self-image as a purveyor of human rights in its foreign 
policies.11  Yet the “human rights card” is applied and 
enforced with considerable elasticity and selectivity and 
it is very difficult to detect a principled thread driving 
the CFSP.  While recognising that other civilisations 
espouse different values, the EU should give serious 
thought to the most effective way of engaging in “values 
competition” without risking unnecessarily deleterious 
material consequences and without compromising its 
basic beliefs.  Media-assisted scuffles around the pas-
sage through Western cities of the Olympic flame in 
2008 did nothing for the people of Tibet and much to 
enflame Chinese nationalism among a younger gen-
eration which had hitherto been relatively immune to it. 
Such activity was counter-productive. A new approach 
to this issue is urgently required.
 At the fourth level, it requires lucidity in terms of 
the principles and means underlying the (muscular) 
promotion of human security.  The European Security 
Strategy states that “We are committed to upholding 
and developing International Law. The fundamental 
framework for international relations is the United Na-
tions Charter. The UNSC has the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity.”  Yet, in 1999, fourteen EU/NATO member states 
agreed to wage war on Serbia in the absence of any 
UN mandate.  In 2003, the EU was split right down 
the middle over the crisis in Iraq. In 2011, the EU (qua 
EU) was hopelessly divided over its policy towards 
the Arab Spring in general and intervention in Libya 
in particular, for which a firm UNSC mandate existed. 
Twenty years ago, the EU could legitimately argue that 
it was not able to intervene effectively in the Balkans. 
After twenty years of preparation and the emergence 
of CSDP, it could not make any such claim over Libya. 
The problem was not capacity but political will. If the 
EU wishes to be effective as a normative power, it must 
come to terms with the circumstances under which it will 
henceforth be prepared – collectively – to apply hard 
power. Otherwise, it will rightly stand accused of being 
an international actor based largely on hot air.
Jolyon Howorth, Yale University
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Two’s Company: But is it Enough? Reflections on 
Anglo-French Defence Cooperation
Anand Menon
 On 2 November 2010, David Cameron and Nico-
las Sarkozy met at London’s Lancaster House. There, 
they announced their intention to sign a Defence & 
Security Co-operation Treaty to develop ‘co-operation 
between our Armed Forces via the sharing and pooling 
of materials and equipment including through mutual 
interdependence, the building of joint facilities, mutual 
access to each other’s defence markets, and industrial 
and technological co-operation.’
 The following examines the implications of this 
agreement for the ability of Europeans to intervene 
effectively in international security affairs. It argues 
that Franco-British collaboration certainly represents 
a useful means for each country to disguise and even 
potentially mitigate the impact of falling defence budgets 
and overstretched capabilities. Yet bilateral collabora-
tion, whilst a useful supplement to broader multilateral 
European schemes, is in no sense a replacement for 
them. Even France and the UK have limited military ca-
pabilities at their disposal and are finding it increasingly 
difficult to sustain large scale military deployments. In 
apparently choosing bilateral cooperation as an alter-
native to the European Union’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), they risk undermining a policy 
designed to reinforce those very capabilities. 
The Roots of Bilateralism
 The agreements forged in London had their origins 
in several factors. First, and most obviously, both France 
and the United Kingdom are confronted by the need 
to make significant savings on defence expenditure. 
Defence budgets in both states are facing serious short-
falls. The French defence budget will rise by only 1% a 
year in real terms between 2012 and 2025. In Britain, 
meanwhile, the coalition government has announced 
cuts amounting to 8% of defence spending over four 
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years, as a consequence of which military personnel 
will be cut by 10%, there will be a 40% reduction in the 
number of tanks and artillery, and a decrease in the 
number of surface ships from 23 to 19. In addition, the 
flagship aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal will be decom-
missioned, and the fleet of Harrier jets will be removed 
from service.
  Budget cuts have certainly been the most signifi-
cant driving force behind the decision by both states to 
undertake more far-reaching cooperation with partners. 
Other factors, however, help explain why bilateral col-
laboration was its chosen form. Both states are jeal-
ous of their standing as global powers, and both are 
more willing than many of their European partners to 
contemplate the deployment of military force as a tool 
of international statecraft. Both, however, are suffering 
from a declining ability to intervene effectively in military 
conflicts. Problems in finding the requisite number of 
troops for interventions in theatres such as Afghanistan, 
or aircraft for the ongoing campaign in Libya testify to 
their declining ability to deploy hard power.
 At the same time, the policies of the two countries 
have gradually converged. Certainly, there still remain 
differences of priority in their foreign policies. Both 
Cameron and Sarkozy were anxious to stress that the 
London treaties do not limit national autonomy over 
defence matters. In the case of the Libyan intervention, 
London and Paris initially took very different positions 
regarding whether intervention should occur under a 
NATO framework. Yet, equally, whilst the last decade 
and a half has seen London reconcile itself to the need 
for Europeans to have some defence capabilities of 
their own coordinated via the European Union, Paris, 
for its part, began a halting rapprochement with NATO 
that culminated in President Sarkozy’s 2009 decision 
to take his country back into the alliance’s integrated 
military structures. 
 Most importantly for our purposes, the London dec-
laration testifies to a further, and potentially disquieting, 
convergence. In stark contrast to another Franco-British 
bilateral dealing with defence matters - some twelve 
years previously at the French resort of Saint Malo - 
no mention was made of the European Union or the 
defence policies that had been launched by that fateful 
meeting between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac. 
 The rationale for the creation of an EU defence 
capacity was that it might help improve European mili-
tary capabilities. Dismay at the inability of Europeans 
to intervene effectively to halt conflict in the Balkans 
led British and French political leaders to seek both 
a policy instrument that might allow Europeans to act 
together outside the framework of NATO, and a solu-
tion to the capabilities gap opening with the United 
States. In London, fears that this gap might lead to 
American disillusionment with, and conceivably even 
disengagement from, NATO added a sense of urgency 
to this quest. From this emerged the European Security 
and Defence Policy (renamed Common Security and 
Defence Policy by the Lisbon Treaty), intended both to 
provide this intervention tool and as a means of inspiring 
other member states to engage seriously in a process 
of capability improvement.  
 Over a decade after its inception, however, there is 
little evidence that CSDP has had the impact hoped for. 
Several member states have shown themselves to be 
singularly lacking in the political will to make use of the 
Union’s new military instrument. German abstention in 
the vote over UNSC 1973 was merely the most recent 
in a long line of examples of member states proving 
unwilling to use ESDP to deploy military force. 
 Meanwhile, capabilities improvements initiatives, 
capabilities conferences and capabilities pledges have 
come and gone, with no recognizable impact on Eu-
ropean militaries characterized by ill adaption to the 
post-Cold War world.  Although EU member states 
have some half a million more men in arms than the 
US, around seventy per cent of their land forces cannot 
operate outside national territory. Even those forces that 
exist and can be deployed cannot always work together 
effectively. Four European states use Chinooks, but with 
different configurations, meaning that spare parts are not 
interchangeable. 
 Little wonder, then, that the two most militarily pow-
erful EU member states, and consequently the states 
which bear the brunt of European military interventions, 
seem to have chosen bilateral cooperation as a way of 
addressing the increasing constraints upon their national 
defence policies. It is easy to understand the attraction of 
bilateral cooperation. For one thing, it neatly avoids the 
myriad problems inherent in discussing security amongst 
twenty-seven states with very different conceptions of 
what ‘security’ means. Paris and London at least share 
a belief in the continued need for Europeans to be able 
to deploy military force globally. For another, cooperation 
with Paris is, for the Conservative members of Britain’s 
coalition government, politically far more palatable than 
multilateral cooperation within an EU framework, as Liam 
Fox, British Defence Minister, made abundantly clear at 
the time of the signing of the treaties. 
The Limits of Bilateralism
 Yet for all its attractions, and whilst bilateral coop-
eration represents a useful supplement to broader co-
operation within the European Union, it is not enough, 
and certainly does not represent a viable alternative to 
the kind of multilateral initiative represented by CSDP. 
For one thing, even larger member states increasingly 
struggle to act alone. The need to mobilize the resources 
EUSA Review    Spring 2011  9 
of as many member states as possible has been all too 
clearly underlined by the problems Britain has encoun-
tered in maintaining its contribution to NATO’s missions 
in Afghanistan and Libya. Even before start of the 
Libyan bombing campaign, senior military figures were 
warning that a prolonged intervention would render the 
country incapable of intervening in the event of unrest 
in states where it has more significant interests such 
as Bahrain or Oman (Financial Times 6 March 2011). 
Respected academic commentators (and the Labour 
opposition) have, for their part, argued that operations 
in North Africa have undermined the conclusions drawn 
by the recent strategic defence review – particularly the 
decisions to scrap Britain’s Harrier fleet, cut the number 
of Tornados, and decommission the country’s aircraft 
carrier (The Sunday Telegraph, 29 May 2011).  
 Of course Britain and France are the leading 
military powers in the EU. Between them they account 
for some 45% of all European military spending.  Yet 
purely bilateral cooperation thus excludes more than 
half of Europe’s military potential. The implications of 
this have been clearly illustrated in North Africa. In the 
early phases of operation, the US carried out around 
half of the airstrikes in Libya. The withdrawal of 40 US 
strike planes in early April meant that other coalition 
members have had to take their place. Immediately 
following the US withdrawal, however, there were signs 
that coalition partners were struggling to make up the 
resultant shortfall (9The Daily Telegraph 6 April 2011).
 Even Britain and France, therefore, have only lim-
ited military capabilities. And it is precisely amongst the 
other member states that there is the most need for 
the kind of stimulus that collaborative schemes could, 
conceivably, provide. For one thing, the fact that the 
European Union now engages in military deployments 
has helped convince member states traditionally reluc-
tant to contemplate the use of hard power to participate 
in such operations. Who could have imagined that Ire-
land would play a central role in military deployments 
to sub-Saharan Africa? In order that the EU reach its 
full potential as an international security actor, it is im-
perative that any means possible be deployed to entice 
those states that do not have military power hardwired 
into their political DNA (as do the British and French) 
to be more active in this area. 
 Moreover, multilateral institutions represent the only 
credible means of cajoling states into making painful 
reforms to their procurement policies and opening up 
their markets to their partners. Even basic information 
sharing between member states raises the prospect 
of painful cuts to national defence expenditures being 
coordinated. Meanwhile, the underused European De-
fence Agency has the potential to provide institutional 
support for initiatives aimed at liberalizing and rational-
izing the European defence market. 
 The existence of institutions created to ensure 
particular outcomes is, clearly, not enough in and of 
itself to ensure that these outcomes transpire. For all 
the talk of capabilities improvements, little or nothing of 
note has transpired to date. The EDA, meanwhile, has 
been around for some six years and has registered only 
small-scale successes in its attempts to open up na-
tional defence markets and foster greater collaboration 
between member states. Nor is there any real prospect 
of the reforms ushered in by the Lisbon treaty leading 
to much immediate improvement (Menon, 2011).
 Yet one way of attempting to induce such progress 
is precisely via committed leadership by those states 
ideally situated to provide it – Britain and France. As 
the Union’s leading military powers, they bear a par-
ticular responsibility for the success of CSDP (which 
they themselves largely designed). For all this, neither 
London nor Paris has, to date, shown any great en-
thusiasm for strengthening the institutions associated 
with CSDP. Whilst Britain has been the most vocal in 
repeatedly blocking requests for adequate funding for 
the EDA (the Conservatives in opposition openly toyed 
with the idea of Britain leaving the organization), the 
French have also shown little interest in being bound 
by institutions that might limit their autonomy in defence 
matters.
 Yet these are the very states that have most to gain 
from a process which generated increased military 
capabilities and an enhanced desire amongst their 
partners to deploy them. Moreover British and French 
defence industries are amongst the most competitive 
in Europe. Liberalization of the marketplace, via, for 
instance, a strengthening of the European Defence 
Agency and steps to extend single market provisions 
to the defence equipment sector, should, then, benefit 
their firms disproportionately. 
 Whilst success if far from guaranteed, the best way 
for both states to ensure progress over capabilities (and 
secure significant comparative advantage for their firms 
in a liberalized market) is to press for an opening of 
procurement markets, promote collaborative ventures, 
and ensure the EDA is sufficiently resourced to play 
its intended role effectively. Leadership by Paris and 
London could play a crucial role in driving this agenda 
forward. 
Conclusion
 It is easy enough to understand why Nicolas Sar-
kozy and David Cameron were tempted by the prospect 
of enhanced bilateral military cooperation. Bilateralism 
neatly side steps the arduous grind of negotiations 
amongst 27 in favour of discussions between two 
states with broadly similar views of world politics, their 
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role within them, and how best to influence them. The 
London treaties, moreover, whilst limited, certainly hold 
out the prospect of resource savings for both states, 
making limited capabilities go further and retarding, if 
not reversing, decline. 
 Underpinning the Franco-British deal is the belief 
on the part of both states that they can continue to 
cling to their ambitions of global military power without 
sacrificing any degree of national control over their de-
fence machineries. Autonomy clearly takes precedence 
over the effective aggregation of resources via pooling 
resources or specialization. 
 Yet if Europeans, including the French and British, 
aspire to exert real influence over international secu-
rity affairs, they must do so collectively, or not at all. 
And for this to happen, Europe’s most powerful states 
must take the lead in attempting to revitalize CSDP, 
committing themselves to working with their partners 
in an attempt to ensure that all member states pull 
their weight and work collaboratively to maximize the 
capabilities the Union can bring to bear in the event of 
a need to intervene with military force. There are, of 
course, no guarantees of success. Several European 
states have shown such disinterest in security and such 
a willingness to free ride on the protection offered by 
others that it may be that even multilateral institutional 
inducements and pressures have little impact on their 
approaches to defence. Yet, ultimately, it is only through 
genuinely multilateral initiatives that Europe can hope 
to impact effectively on international security affairs. 
Franco-British cooperation does not necessarily work 
against such multilateral schemes, but it is crucial that 
it not be seen as an alternative to them. 
Anand Menon, University of Birmingham
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Matching Ambitions to Resources:  Paying for 
CFSP in an Era of Fiscal Restraint
Zachary Selden
 The European Union is building the institutional 
capability to play a larger role in global security affairs 
and, despite the emphasis on the non-military aspects 
of security, there is an acknowledged need to develop 
improved power projection capabilities to engage in the 
full range of tasks incorporated under the broad rubric 
of crisis management.  European militaries, however, 
are for the most part still in the process of transforming 
themselves from static defense forces into deployable 
forces that are useful for the sort of crisis manage-
ment missions in which the EU envisages itself play-
ing a larger (and more independent) role in the future. 
Therefore, doing so will entail distinct costs that have 
only been partially dealt with to date.  
 We should not discount the progress that has been 
made in pooling assets and the strategic agreement 
between France and the United Kingdom as ways to 
manage the costs of European ambitions.   Despite 
this progress, however, there are near-term and long-
term trends that will significantly impact on European 
spending on defense and foreign affairs in general.  In 
the near term, there is the on-going sovereign debt 
crisis in the Eurozone that has obvious implications for 
spending across the board.  Yet, even if this is solved 
relatively painlessly, there is a more consequential long-
term demographic trend that will impact on spending 
for security and defense for many years to come.  The 
critical test of whether the EU can manage those trends 
and produce a CFSP with significant, deployable and 
sustainable power behind it will be how the member 
states reform their militaries and shift spending away 
from personnel budgets and toward procurement and 
operations.  
The Debt Crisis and its Effects on Spending
 The global economic downturn and the sovereign 
debt crisis have distinct implications for defense spend-
ing across Europe.  Although there are variations across 
the member states, the aggregate figures for 2008 and 
2009 are telling.  In that year Europe-wide GDP shrank 
by 5.6%.  Overall government expenditure rose by 
2.4% in that period while defense expenditures fell by 
3.5%.1   It is of course impossible to balance the na-
tional budgets of the members of the EU through cuts 
in defense expenditures that only in a few countries 
amount to more than 2% of GDP, but in times of fiscal 
constraint, defense budgets are a relatively easy target 
for reductions.  
 The member states of Central and Eastern Europe 
are enacting severe cuts in defense expenditures over 
the next few years.  Bulgaria enacted a 40% cut in its 
budget for 2010.  The Czech Republic is reducing its 
defense budget by 20% by the end of 2011 and Latvia 
cut its defense budget by nearly 50% between 2008 and 
2010.  The more established and wealthier members 
of the EU are also making significant cuts.  Austria is 
seeking to trim its budget by 20% by 2015 and Ger-
many is attempting to implement a 25% reduction in 
the same time frame.  The two members comprising 
the bulk of the EU’s deployable capability, France and 
the UK, also plan to trim their budgets by approximately 
7% by 2015.2   It is somewhat optimistic to assume 
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that those reductions represent the bottoming out of 
defense budgets and that further reductions will not 
be implemented.  The sovereign debt crisis affecting 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and other states in the EU 
has not yet been properly factored into the equation. 
The fund established to bail out those states and ensure 
the stability of the Euro is currently 750 billion Euros, 
but depending on the depth and breadth of the crisis, 
that fund may have to be significantly increased.3  
 It appears unlikely that Portugal, Greece or Ireland 
will experience economic growth at levels that will en-
able them to pull themselves out of the crisis without 
restructuring at least part of their debt.4  The countries in 
question will be unlikely to be able to support increased 
or even stable funding for their militaries, but much of 
the rest of Europe will also be fiscally constrained for 
some time to come as a result of their lending prac-
tices.  German and French banks, for example, hold 
approximately 900 billion Euros in Greek, Portuguese 
and Irish debt that may become worth far less in the 
near future if a restructuring of that debt becomes nec-
essary.5   In order to prevent defaults that would have 
disastrous consequences for the viability of the common 
currency, holders of that debt may be forces to accept 
large write-downs on their investments.6   Large-scale 
public funding would then be needed to ensure the vi-
ability of exposed banks in Germany and France.  In 
other words, it does not take extreme scenarios of the 
fragmentation of the Eurozone or the exit of Greece 
from the common currency to project an extended fis-
cal crunch across Europe that will force governments 
to channel funds to maintain the stability of the banking 
system.
 Although defense spending is a small percentage 
of total government spending, it represents a target of 
opportunity for national leaders seeking additional bud-
getary savings and ways to channel existing resources 
toward the critical function of stabilizing the banking 
sector.  Compared to other budget items that the public 
is deeply concerned about such as health, pensions 
and other benefits they directly experience, defense is 
not a core concern of most European publics and there 
are few domestic political ramifications to cutting into 
the defense budget.
The Effects of an Aging Europe on European 
Defense and Security
 The debt crisis and its impact on European budgets 
is a relatively short-term problem.  The longer-term 
issue for European defense budgets, however, is a 
demographic shift with profound consequences.  As a 
number of studies spell out with some precision, the 
population of most European countries is aging rapidly, 
meaning that retirement benefits and health care for the 
  aged will be paid from a smaller tax base.  Thus, while 
Europe is attempting to build the means to act indepen-
dently from the United States, Europe will be set upon 
by a host of difficult choices whose likely resolutions will 
deprive Europe of the financial resources it needs to 
invest if it is to develop the capabilities needed to play 
a truly independent role in military operations beyond 
its current level.
 The average age of the population of Europe will 
increase dramatically in the next twenty to thirty years, 
although there is considerable variation between in-
dividual members of the EU.  According to estimates 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
46 % of the population of Italy and Spain and 35 % of 
the population of France will be above the age of 60 in 
2040.7    Given current benefits, each retiree in Germany 
will have to be supported by 1.6 workers and each Ital-
ian and Spanish working age person will have to support 
one retiree. The consequences of this situation should 
not be underestimated.  Either benefits will have to be 
reduced, taxes will have to increase, governments will 
have to borrow more to sustain the aging population or 
immigration will have to sharply increase to supply the 
workforce and rebalance the population.8     
 Some members of the EU are engaging in reforms 
along those general lines, but the political consequenc-
es of this path are readily apparent to those leaders 
who faced protests over increases in retirement ages 
or university fees in France and the UK.  The negative 
political consequences of taking steps to ensure the vi-
ability of the welfare state that directly impact on citizens’ 
benefits or incomes makes another option more likely 
in the near-term: shifting resources from other forms of 
government spending to shore up the pension system. 
Among the likely candidates for further cuts are defense 
and international affairs budgets. 
 Thus, over the next several decades, Europe likely 
will have fewer resources to devote to international af-
fairs. An aging population will require more and more 
resources to maintain it and there will be fewer working-
age individuals whose income can be taxed to pay 
for those benefits.  Some changes can and are being 
implemented such as raising the retirement age, and 
shifting health care toward private insurance based 
programs, but in the near-term governments are likely 
to continue to trim spending on international affairs, 
the military and foreign assistance programs.  Simply 
put, a proposal to cut benefits to the fastest growing 
segment of the population has political consequences 
at the voting booth, but reducing spending on defense 
and international affairs has little domestic political cost 
among most European publics.
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Shifting Resources Within National 
Defense Budgets
 Given those general conditions, it is unlikely that 
most European militaries will have the financial resourc-
es to develop improved power projection capabilities. 
In fact, further decreases are likely as national leaders 
seek to wring budgetary savings out of defense and 
security to pay for other issues that are more relevant 
to their political future.  Some savings have already 
been found in pooling assets and sharing resources, 
and there is no doubt more work that can be done in this 
area.  However, the real test will be shifting resources 
within national defense budgets so that the increasingly 
limited total amounts are spent more on operations and 
procurement and less on personnel.
 Any national defense budget rests on a tripod of 
spending on operations, procurement and person-
nel with smaller fractions spent on infrastructure and 
research and development.  Ideally there should be a 
rough balance between the three legs of the tripod in 
any military that engages in expeditionary operations. 
Yet, for the most part, European defense budgets are 
heavily weighted toward personnel.  Most spend well 
above 30% of their national budgets on personnel and 
several, including Belgium and Portugal spend more 
than 70% on personnel.    The result is that only a small 
fraction of each Euro in the national defense budget is 
spent on operations or procurement.  In other words, 
most of the defense budget is spent on maintaining 
militaries that cannot go where they are needed with 
the equipment necessary to perform the missions and 
tasks that the EU has designated for itself.  Serious 
reform must start with recalibrating the balance between 
personnel and other expenditures within the national 
defense budgets so that operations and procurement 
are favored in an era of fiscal restraint.  Unfortunately, 
the trend appears to be somewhat in the opposite direc-
tion.  In 2008 the members of the EU spend an average 
of 54% of their defense budgets on personnel.  That 
rose to 56% in 2009. 
 The EU can improve the match between its resourc-
es and its ambitions, but it requires a realistic appraisal 
of what is possible in an era of financial restraint.  To 
the extent that existing resources can be shifted from 
personnel to procurement and operations, and common 
capabilities, asset sharing and pooling can be exploited, 
there is room to develop considerable additional capa-
bility.  Doing so, however, will require a concerted effort 
on the part of European political leaders to make the 
public case for it in the face of competing priorities that 
are of more direct relevance to the voting public.
Zachary Selden, University of Florida
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Government Debt and Fiscal Rules in Europe 
– A New Proposal1
Andrew Hughes Hallett
The SGP and government debt in Europe
 The stability and growth pact (SGP) doesn’t 
seem to have worked in its current form; the reason be-
ing that the focus has been mostly on the government 
budget deficit limit of 3% of GDP (with a large list of 
exceptions) and very little focus (until the most recent 
revision of the SGP) on government net debt relative 
to GDP.  Yet in the current financial crisis in Europe, it 
is debt that is the major concern and what drives the 
likelihood of sovereign debt defaults. As a result there 
has had to be a shift in focus by market participants 
and economists towards levels of government debt and 
what might represent the best fiscal rules to maintain 
sustainability in these debt levels.
 In this short note, a new approach to imposing 
debt limits as a form of fiscal restraint in Europe is pro-
posed, and some of the issues entailed in implementing 
such a proposal are explored.
The Analytic Framework
Stabilising the economy at a given debt target: The 
identity describing the evolution of an economy’s public 
debt burden is given by: 
( )d pdef r g d m= + − −                                                   (1)
where d represents the public debt-to-GDP ratio,  d  
denotes the change in that ratio per unit of time, pdef is 
the primary deficit (defined such that pdef > 0 implies a 
deficit), r is the average real rate of interest charged on 
debt, g is the rate of growth of output in real terms, and 
m  is the change in the ratio of the money stock to GDP 
per unit of time (Bohn 1998, de Grauwe, 2009).  The 
reasoning here is that if the debt to GDP ratio grows, 
one of four things happen: the deficit increases, or the 
real interest rate increases (implying higher payments 
on existing debt), or the rate of growth in the economy 
falls (hence raising the debt to GDP ratio), or the rate 
of growth of monetary expansion falls. The latter im-
poses a lower inflation tax on existing nominal debt and 
thereby raises the current real debt burden.
 First assume that the rate of money growth, 
0m = . If that is the case, the debt ratio will stabilise if 
0d = . In view of the debt dynamics in (1), this happens 
when                                                                                                                       
( )pb r g d= −                (2)
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where pb is the budget’s primary surplus defined as 
( ) /pdef G T Y pb= − = −  (G is government spending 
net of interest payments, and T are total government 
revenues). Thus if r > g, the government must run a 
primary surplus to stop the debt burden rising, and an 
even larger one to reduce the debt burden.2  And that 
primary surplus will need to be bigger, the greater is r 
> g and the greater is the initial debt burden d. Failing 
that, the debt burden will rise. But if r < g, the govern-
ment may run a primary deficit as long as it is not larger 
than the term on the right of (2).
 Nothing in this analysis says what debt level 
will or should be reached at the end of the correction 
process; or whether that position will be stable or not. 
To investigate these questions, we need to specify a 
primary surplus reaction function that governments 
would choose to follow - or could be made to follow. As 
things stand, the debt burden will shrink without limit so 
long as the primary surplus is always set larger than 
the right hand side of (2). But it will rise, again without 
limit, if that inequality is reversed. 
 Neither of those two scenarios is either plau-
sible or desirable. However, we can get a grip on how 
to solve these questions if we use the “fiscal space” 
analysis of Ostry et al. (2010). On the basis of data from 
23 advanced economies, Ostry et al. find a statistically 
significant cubic relationship for the setting of primary 
surpluses as a function of debt levels.3  This gives rise 
to an S-shaped reaction function, as shown in Figure 
1, which describes how the average OECD economy 
had actually set its primary surpluses as debt burdens 
rose: the left hand side of (2). The right hand side of (2) 
also rises with debt: it is the straight line in the diagram 
for the case when r > g. 
 As drawn, there are two intersection points; 
one at d*, and one at d2. The first, d*, represents the 
equilibrium value, where the debt ratio will ultimately 
settle so long as we are still operating below the level 
of d2. This is an equilibrium because, for d < d*, the 
primary surplus pb is less than (r-g)d. So  . But for d*< 
d < d2, we have pb > (r-g)d so  . However at d2 and 
beyond, the debt burden increases without limit since 
pb ≤ (r-g)d. Hence, there is a stable equilibrium at d* 
and an unstable one at d2. 
The Aim and Strategy of Debt Control 
 If we have a serious idea of the optimal level 
of debt, derived perhaps from a theoretical model of 
 
Figure 1: Determination of the Equilibrium Debt Target 
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the advantages and disadvantages of holding debt for 
promoting growth, employment or smoothing (and to 
be able to resolve that question would in itself be an 
important innovation), or if a common debt target is set 
for administrative or political convenience at (say) 60% 
for all Eurozone countries, then the institutional part of 
the problem is to find a set of fiscal rules or budgetary 
constraints that set the debt ratio, by choice of pb, to 
adjust according to (2) until d* is reached - and then to 
estimate d2 in order to be able to stay well away from 
it. 
Discussion
 The framework above separates the fiscal 
control problem into two parts: a) the zone of safety 
(stability); b) the critical value beyond which debt 
explodes. The research here suggests that instead 
of implementing a “one-size-fits-all” fiscal policy that 
there are in fact 4-zones for each member state that 
would depend on the values of r and g.  This is in stark 
contrast to the existing SGP which treats all member 
states as subject to the same rules, and it suggests that 
fiscal rules should be applied on a case-by-case basis 
according to the level of growth and real interest rates 
in a member state rather than a fixed deficit to GDP 
ratio as has been the case under the SGP.  
 The above analysis suggests that a sufficiently 
large primary surplus needs to be run once a certain 
ratio of debt to GDP is reached.  The important point 
here is to determine where the critical point d2 for each 
member state and then to devise a fiscal rule that as-
sures that the member state has to run a sufficiently 
large primary surplus once a lower value for the debt 
to GDP ratio is reached.  That way this will assure that 
the critical point is not reached as if exceeded then debt 
default becomes almost certain.  
Andrew Hughes Hallett, George Mason University, 
USA, and the University of St Andrews, Scotland
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Endnotes
1  This a summary of the paper “Is there a Need for a New 
Fiscal Framework in the Euro Area” by Andrew Hughes 
Hallett and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen (Copenhagen 
Business School) that was presented at the EUSA confer-
ence in Boston, March 2011.  Patrick M. Crowley (Texas 
A&M University – Corpus Christi) also contributed to this 
summary of the paper.
2 Values of  pb > (r – g)d  will ensure falling debt burdens, 
0d < .
  
3 One may hypothesize a relationship of this form on the 
basis that policymakers make little effort to raise a primary 
surplus at low levels of debt, and then find they are unable 
to do so (or that the political consequences of attempt-
ing to do so are too severe) at very high levels of debt – a 
situation often referred to as “fiscal fatigue” or “reaching 
the fiscal limit”. However, this cubic relationship seems to 
be very fragile statistically and hard to reproduce on other 
or more recent sets of data; in particular at the individual 
country level. Since we are not really interested in a mythi-
cal average OECD economy, or in what governments did 
in the past, one of the major challenges in this analysis 
is to design a suitable set of fiscal rules that will create a 
reaction function with the properties of that in Figure 1.
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multipolar or even an ‘interpolar’ or ‘non-polar’ system. 
 Alongside this question of power distribution 
goes a second question about what might be described 
as political opportunity structures in the world arena. 
Opportunity structures can be open or closed to the 
presence and voices of new actors, and they create 
incentives or constraints affecting not only the actors 
themselves but also the formulation of international 
rules or conventions.  As a result, ‘diplomatic spaces’ 
in the world arena have changed and are changing. 
 These changes in the global context for diplo-
macy have been associated with two key changes in 
the nature of diplomatic activity. The first concerns the 
institutional structures within which diplomacy takes 
place, which have diversified and expanded, giving 
rise to what has been described as ‘multi-stakeholder 
diplomacy’. The second concerns the ways in which 
new forms of diplomacy fulfil the functions identified 
above: deliberation, representation, communication and 
negotiation. As a result of these changes, the concept 
of ‘diplomacy’ has both expanded and become more 
contestable, at both the ‘actor’ level and the systemic 
level.
 
The EU’s Emerging System of Diplomacy
 Much attention has been paid to the ways in 
which the new institutional framework for EU diplomacy 
has been established and developed. One key element 
is distinctive to the EU: it is in itself a system of diplo-
macy, embodying a process of continuous negotiation 
and deliberation among the member states and a range 
of other stakeholders. So the institutions of the EU’s sys-
tem of ‘external’ diplomacy, and the rules and resources 
it brings to bear on its external policies, reflect internal 
diplomatic compromises and constraints. Within the EU 
institutions themselves, the perceived disruptive effects 
of the establishment of the High Representative/Vice-
President (HRVP) and the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) have sharply focused this process. The 
HRVP and the EEAS consequently confront questions 
about their institutional status that will impact on the 
perceived legitimacy and credibility of EU diplomacy. At 
the same time, the EU is seeking to implant itself more 
fully into the global diplomatic system, and in a way to 
reproduce a conventional diplomatic machine at the EU 
level, at a time when that global system of diplomacy 
is itself in flux. 
 It is clear from this that Lisbon did not un-
equivocally resolve the question of the EU’s system of 
diplomacy. It provided for institutions, but not without 
leaving these institutions open to question and chal-
lenge. It provided for resources, both administrative and 
financial, but not without leaving open the issue of the 
budget and of the ways in which personnel would be 
Developing EU Diplomacy in a 
Challenging World
Michael Smith
 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
attention has largely been focused on the construction 
of the EU’s new diplomatic machinery. The purpose of 
this short paper is to explore some ways in which the 
development of the EU’s diplomacy since Lisbon  re-
lates to the changing nature of diplomacy more broadly, 
and to the challenges of a turbulent global  environ-
ment. In doing this, the paper distils work with which 
I have been engaged in a Jean Monnet Multilateral 
Research Network, based at Loughborough University 
and embodying a partnership with Maastricht Univer-
sity (Netherlands) and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
(Belgium).1  The paper addresses three aspects of the 
problem: first, the changing diplomatic context; second, 
the EU’s emerging system of diplomacy; and finally, 
two key areas of external challenge, relations with the 
Great Powers, and relations with the ‘Arab spring’.
The Changing Diplomatic Context
 In assessing the EU’s emerging system of 
diplomacy, it is important to put it into the context of 
diplomacy more generally. Diplomacy can be presented 
as the means of formulating and implementing exter-
nal action through four key processess: deliberation, 
representation, communication and negotiation. It is 
not simply the passive implementation of decisions 
taken elsewhere by politicians – rather, it embodies an 
active process through which a diplomatic actor faces 
the world. Diplomatic action at one level is simply what 
diplomats do, in terms of the four processes  outlined 
above, but it also takes place within a broader context 
of structures, strategies, institutions, rules and cultures 
that constitutes the diplomatic system, which  has both 
a national (or European) and global face to it (Hocking 
and Smith 2011). The interaction of the national (or Eu-
ropean) system of diplomacy with the global system is 
thus central to analysis of its effectiveness and impact. 
 The core elements of diplomacy have been 
crystallized and given additional force by the changing 
diplomatic context. In particular, they have been affected 
by four key dimensions of change. The first of these is 
the changing distribution of power in the world arena 
since the end of the Cold War. We have moved from 
the Cold War system of dominant bipolarity, through an 
effectively unipolar system centred on the United States 
into what many have characterised as an emerging 
EU as a Global Actor
Interest Section
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attached to the system. It initiated a set of diplomatic 
practices, but did not settle the question of the relations 
between those practices and the existing, deeply em-
bedded practices of national or European institutions. It 
called for a strategic approach to diplomacy, but did not 
resolve the issues of international status and credibility 
that inevitably lie behind any EU strategic diplomacy 
(Joint Report 2010).
 As a result, the first eighteen months of the post-
Lisbon era have been inevitably preoccupied with the 
domestic arrangements essential to giving life to the 
EU’s system of diplomacy. But the world will not wait 
for this kind of exercise to be completed, and equally 
inevitably there have arisen key international challenges 
that have constituted a test of the emerging diplomatic 
machine. 
Two Challenges to EU Diplomacy
 Two major challenges during the past eighteen 
months have tested the legitimacy and  credibility of 
the EU’s new system of diplomacy. The first of these 
is the ‘great power’ test – the challenge of establishing 
EU diplomacy in a world where emergent and actual 
great powers are entering into new alignments. The 
second is the ‘neighbourhood’ test’ – and particularly 
the test generated by the impact of radical change in 
the southern Mediterranean, in the form of the ‘Arab 
spring’. To what extent has the emerging diplomatic 
system of the EU met these tests?
 On the ‘great power’ test, the evidence in the 
short term seems negative. Although the HRVP has 
established good working relationships with the USA 
and especially with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
it is not clear yet what the benefit is of at last having a 
specific telephone number or email address for Europe. 
Indeed, whilst the Americans might know the number, 
it is clear that on many key issues they don’t yet call 
it, preferring to deal with individual EU member states 
according to the needs of a pragmatic realist policy 
(Smith 2011). The Chinese, partly preoccupied with 
their adversarial partnership with the USA, equally 
show a reluctance to recognise Brussels as the fount 
of European diplomacy. Indeed, one significant char-
acteristic of the post-Lisbon period so far is that both 
Beijing and Washington have followed a more calibrated 
multi-level diplomacy towards the EU, differentiating 
strongly between the EU and the member states. Two 
of the other ‘strategic partners’ identified by the EU, 
India and Brazil, are ruled especially by their regional 
preoccupations and their commercial objectives, and 
this combination does not leave much space for the EU 
to insert itself diplomatically. Finally, the evidence on EU 
relations with Russia remains ambiguous: here is the 
nearest of neighbours, and a key strategic actor, but 
one that speaks a different diplomatic language from 
that of the normative and multilateralist EU on many 
issues. It does not appear that the call by some for a 
strengthened set of strategic partnerships as the core 
of a new ‘great power diplomacy’ on the part of the EU 
has yet produced a coherent diplomatic response either 
from the EU or from its putative partners, and the EEAS’ 
review of these partnerships has apparently spawned 
little that is new (EEAS, 2010).
 On the test of the ‘neighbourhood’ and spe-
cifically of the ‘Arab Spring’, the lessons so far seem 
equally negative. Here is an issue – or a set of issues 
– where the EU has had a pre-existing institutional 
engagement, underpinned by resources in the form of 
economic assistance and market power, and a clear 
political interest in intervening for the cause of democra-
tisation and stabilisation. But this has been a crisis (or a 
succession of crises), in which events are unpredictable 
and in which the deliberative aspect of EU diplomacy 
is distinctly disadvantaged. As a result, the diplomatic 
space that existed for the EU in the early stages of the 
process seems to have been unexploited and to have 
closed down, in favour of diplomacy by contact group 
and intervention by a coalition of the willing including 
leading EU member states. At the same time, there 
has been self-conscious abstention by other leading 
member states, and a distinct lack of consensus on 
the day to day management of the unfolding challenge. 
As Sven Biscop has argued, this does not preclude 
the development of an effective EU diplomacy in the 
longer term, based on a definition of the EU’s vital in-
terests, on the identification of clear priorities and on 
the dedication of appropriate capabilities, economic, 
diplomatic and eventually military, to the management 
of the long-term stability of the southern Mediterranean 
region (Biscop 2011). The difficulty is that the lack of 
consensus on intervention in the region may feed back 
into the ‘internal’ diplomacy of the EU and create issues 
for the future development of EU crisis management 
capabilities. Another difficulty is that the attempt by the 
EU to conduct a diplomacy towards the region informed 
by specifically European norms and values may not 
coincide with the demands or aspirations of peoples 
within the region, and thus that it will lack credibility 
(Youngs 2011).
Conclusion
 This discussion has outlined key changes in 
diplomacy that impact upon the emerging diplomatic 
system of the EU. On one level the EU might appear 
well placed to make a reality of new forms of multilevel 
and multi-stakeholder diplomacy, but the hybrid nature 
of EU diplomacy itself does not always provide a firm 
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basis on which to innovate and develop. At the same 
time, the first eighteen months of the post-Lisbon era 
have demonstrated one of the timeless truths of di-
plomacy – that events will not wait until processes of 
internal deliberation and institution-building can be com-
pleted. External challenges have met with an uncertain 
response in terms of communication and negotiation, 
and there is evidence that in some member states there 
is a backlash against the perceived expansionism of 
the EEAS. But the system does survive: the question 
is whether it is now subject to  a range of restrictions 
that will hobble it for the long term, rather than a set 
of transient challenges, and whether the opportunities 
and policy spaces in which EU diplomacy might make 
a real difference are likely to open up in a way that can 
be recognised and acted upon.
 Michael Smith,  Loughborough University
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 Teething Problems of the European 
External Action Service
Jost-Henrik Morgenstern
 While the European External Action Service 
emerges as an administrative actor in EU politics, this 
note highlights some problems the new organisation 
is facing. Firstly, the EEAS suffers from the old dis-
agreements about the nature of European integration. 
Secondly, it is serving a multitude of principals with po-
tentially contradictory interests. Some examples of the 
bureaucratic teething problems illustrate the practical 
consequences of the complex environment the EEAS 
operates in.
 Since its establishment in 2010, the debate 
about the institutional structures in EU foreign policy 
has found a new focus in the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). The recent public debate about the 
new organisation has in part been less than benign, 
focusing on criticisms of the High Representative by 
several ministers from usually supportive countries 
such as Belgium and Germany (The Guardian 2011). In 
many ways, these signs of discontent are expressions 
of both old disagreements about the scope of the EU 
and of the structural difficulties the new organisation 
is facing. The EEAS is criticised on the one hand for 
being ineffective, while on the other hand it is being 
accused of trying to unduly extend its influence. These 
contradictions show that the EEAS as an organisation 
“cannot help but begin life as a unique structural reflec-
tion of its own politics“ (Moe 1990: 143). These politics 
have their roots in conflicts inherent in the EU’s political 
system and its institutional structure. 
EU Politics of Diplomatic Structure
 The politics of the EEAS have a particular 
European flavour to them. In order to understand the 
relations between the EEAS and its principals at the 
European level, Dehousse argues for the need to de-
velop a “multi-principals model” (2008: 790-1). While 
his argument is tailored towards EU regulatory agen-
cies (Dehousse 2008: 797), it may serve equally well 
in analyzing the teething problems of the EEAS. The 
complexity of the EEAS’ relations with its environment 
derives from three fundamental conceptual issues: the 
difficulty of identifying a single institution that would 
qualify as principal, the “composite” nature of the nu-
merous potential principals (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 
2002), as well as the specific dependence on two par-
tially competing administrative actors. 
 Several actors involved in different stages of the 
EEAS’ creation may qualify as a principal. It was the 
European Council with agreement of the President of 
the Commission that appointed the High Representative 
EUSA Review    Spring 2011  19 
(European Council 2009), who is in charge of the EEAS. 
It then took a Council decision based on a proposal of 
the High Representative to establish the EEAS (Council 
of the EU 2010). The European Parliament attempted 
to leverage its legislative powers over the staff and 
financial regulations and was consequently included in 
the negotiations on elements of the Council decision 
(Missiroli 2010: 436).  While the EP has a less direct 
access, it is likely to continue pushing for accountability 
mechanisms such as hearings and use its budgetary 
powers to wield influence on the EEAS. The Council 
decision specified among other things those parts of the 
EU institutions that were to be merged into the EEAS 
structure. Member states negotiated among themselves 
as well as with the EEAS, the European Commission 
and Council Secretariat General, whose organisational 
elements were to join the service (Missiroli 2010:  435-
6). Because of the composite nature of the Council, 
member states have not represented a united front in 
these negotiations, nor have they fully agreed on the 
scope of the EEAS’ functions (European Voice 2011). 
Since the European Commission retains the adminis-
tration of funding mechanisms, it will continue have a 
strong influence on the new organisation’s ability to act. 
On Brussels’ turf
 Underneath the political level, the embryonic 
EEAS had to negotiate with the Commission and Coun-
cil Secretariat General about administrative details 
of the transfer of staff and responsibilities in order to 
guarantee service continuity. These negotiations re-
sulted in framework agreements between the EEAS 
and the Commission and Council Secretariat as well as 
individual service-level agreements between the EEAS 
and for example the re-designed Directorate General 
for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid (DG 
DEVCO). First evidence suggests that these nego-
tiations were a continuation of rather difficult relations 
between the “functionally autonomous body” (Council 
of the EU 2010) and its parent institutions. In particular, 
the Commission’s attitude was seen as “unhelpful” by 
staff negotiating on behalf of the EEAS (Interview B, 
2011). But also the Council Secretariat was not always 
perceived as following the spirit of the agreements. On 
one occasion, the Secretariat was reported to have 
transferred empty posts to the service rather than actual 
staff (Interview C, 2011). 
 Still, self-interested behaviour by the other 
Brussels bureaucracies may be only part of the story. 
Already in the Council decision, the EEAS had been 
assigned almost exclusively staff from thematic or geo-
graphic desks. This has caused a relative scarcity in 
administrative resources in terms of budgeting, human 
resources and IT. Difficulties in paying out salary cor-
rectly and providing EEAS’ staff with access to emails 
and phones in the first weeks of its existence have been 
some of the reported signs of “a challenging first year” 
(Interview B, 2011). While these teething problems are 
being sorted out, an additional administrative challenge 
will come in the years ahead when national diplomats, 
which are supposed to represent about a third of EEAS 
staff, join in greater numbers. So far, they have entered 
the service only at the level of corporate board or heads 
of delegations. It remains to be seen whether member 
states will still see the EEAS as an essential destination 
for its diplomats as they did during the negotiations on 
the service, when according to one observer “attention 
was disproportionately on numbers: how do we get in? 
At what level? With how many people?” (Interview A, 
2010).
 While the initial difficulties are an indication that 
also the European External action Service may not be 
“designed to be effective” (Moe 1989: 267), the jury is 
still out on whether the EEAS will bring about more co-
herence and a better representation of the EU abroad. 
Institutional approaches will have a major contribution 
to make in analysing the service’s operation and impact 
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EU Public Policy Interest Section
Studying the Fine Print:  Policy Convergence 
and the New Transatlantic Agenda
Laurie Buonanno and Neill Nugent
 
 
 This essay reports on a research project—The 
New Transatlantic Agenda:  Public Administration and 
Policy Perspectives—in which several members of 
the EUSA Public Policy Interest Section are involved. 
We took the occasion of our business meeting in Bos-
ton (EUSA 2011) to continue to explore the research 
dimensions of the project. We welcome contributions 
to this ongoing project and hope this essay will inspire 
some EUSA members to consider participating. 
 The study of transatlantic relations has been 
a popular topic since President Kennedy visited Ber-
lin, but perhaps the current tsunami of writing can be 
traced to Robert Kagan’s article (2002), popularized 
in a book-length essay (2003), where his opening 
paragraph cannily played off the thesis of John Gray’s 
1992 book, Men are from Mars, Women are from Ve-
nus: 
 It is time to stop pretending that Europeans 
and Americans share a common view of the world, or 
even that they occupy the same world. On the all-im-
portant question of power — the efficacy of power, the 
morality of power, the desirability of power — Ameri-
can and European perspectives are diverging…That 
is why on major strategic and international questions 
today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are 
from Venus: They agree on little and understand one 
another less and less. 
 A student’s reading list on transatlantic rela-
tions might include: Daum’s (2003) Kennedy in Berlin; 
Ash’s (2004) The Free World; Baldwin’s (2009) The 
Narcissism of Minor Differences:  How America and 
Europe are Alike;  Martinelli’s (2007) Transatlantic 
Divide:  Comparing European and American Society; 
Sola and Smith’s (2009) Perceptions and Policies in 
Transatlantic Relations:  Prospective Visions from the 
US and Europe; Alcaro and Jones (2011) European 
Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations; 
and EUSA’s own contributions to the dialogue—
Elizabeth Ponds’s Friendly Fire (2003) and Jabko 
and Parsons’  (2005)  With US or Against US? Eu-
ropean Trends in American Perspective.  These and 
other writings cover a wide range of subjects within 
the broader theme of transatlantic relations, even if 
many of these (understandably) emphasize security 
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relations.  Think tanks, such as the Center for Trans-
atlantic Relations (Johns Hopkins SAIS), are also con-
tributing timely and well-researched reports.  
 Given this prodigious output, is there room for 
policy specialists, oriented toward comparative pub-
lic policy rather than international relations, to enter 
the arena of transatlantic studies? Is there anything 
much new left to study, or to say? We have concluded 
that there is, with the surprisingly under-studied New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). Building on the 1990 
Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations, which 
called for greater transatlantic cooperation and con-
sultation, the NTA, which was agreed in 1995, estab-
lished four main goals: promoting peace and stability, 
democracy and development around the world; re-
sponding to global challenges; contributing to the ex-
pansion of world trade and closer economic relations; 
and building bridges across the Atlantic.1 
 It is the fourth of these goals that is of particu-
lar interest to us. . This is because our  research group 
came together, and our research became financially 
possible, through  an Atlantis mobility project co-fund-
ed by the US Department of Education (USDOE) and 
the European Commission’s Education, Audiovisual 
and Cultural Executive Agency (EACEA). This mobility 
grant is one of several concrete initiatives to emerge 
from the NTA.2  The  consortium (with Manchester Met-
ropolitan University as the European lead and Buffalo 
State as the US lead) that was awarded the four-year 
Atlantis grant in 2009 was charged to fund transatlan-
tic student exchanges, to develop a shared curriculum 
in transatlantic public administration and policy (which 
would include a globally-networked online capstone 
course entitled, naturally (!), “Transatlantic Public Ad-
ministration and Policy”), and to deliver research out-
puts that would advance this field of study.  Our grant 
writing team—the first Atlantis grant to be awarded to 
political scientists and public administrators—made 
the  case for the need to train a cadre of public ser-
vants schooled in public administration and policy, 
both in the classroom and through interning in pub-
lic agencies across the Atlantic.  For State University 
of New York students, this meant Manchester or Cluj, 
and for British and Romanian (Babeş Bolyai Univer-
sity) students, this was Buffalo, Cortland, and Albany 
(where students intern in the NYS Assembly for the 
second-half of their transatlantic study year). 
 Training students to understand domestic poli-
cy in the context of US, EU, and transatlantic policy di-
mensions required faculty to generate new knowledge 
about the transatlantic policy relationship.  Where to 
start?  An obvious avenue to move beyond a gener-
alist approach to policy and administration training 
was to examine the existing overarching agreement 
between the EU and the US designed to forge closer 
policy ties (and convergence): that is, the NTA.  It then 
seemed a natural progression in our thinking that our 
research project would examine public administration 
and policies in the context of the overall mission and 
concrete goals of the NTA and as part of this project, 
we would take stock of its deliverables in the nearly 
two decades since its inception.3    
 Our working group’s first project is an edited 
volume entitled, “The New Transatlantic Agenda: 
Public Administration and Policy Perspectives.”  The 
book consists of three parts:  Part I will serve as an 
overview to the NTA and transatlantic relations, theo-
retical conceptions of EU-US governance, and shared 
values. Part II will focus on administrative practices in 
the US and the EU. Part III will contain policy studies, 
with each chapter written as a comparison of EU-US 
policy.
 To develop this a little, we are examining the 
historical background leading up to the establishment 
of the NTA, the NTA’s goals and objectives, as well as 
the extent to which the NTA is shaped by shared norms 
(the latter being a key feature of the Transatlantic Dec-
laration). We examine the administrative context (gov-
ernance of the NTA such as institutional architecture, 
new governance, training), the evolution of the policy 
portfolio covered under the NTA (e.g. spillover into oth-
er policy areas), the extent to which there is participa-
tion of societal actors,  the incidence of public-private 
partnerships (core features of the NTA design),  and 
convergence or lack thereof of policies (with a particu-
lar focus on trade, competition, transportation, highly-
skilled migration, and foreign policy). 
 Without funding, it can be difficult to establish 
research working groups outside of a university or 
policy institute umbrella.  The opportunity to draw on 
the expertise of the EUSA public policy interest sec-
tion has, we think, made a positive contribution to the 
quality of our project design.  
 The success of the NTA depends upon shared 
ideals and objectives of politicians in the EU and the 
US. The Atlantis Cooperation program is no different. 
Hence, it is disappointing that the U.S. Congress re-
cently cut USDOE’s comprehensive programs by 40 
percent—and with it the 2011 competition.4    All of us 
with current Atlantis grants face some cuts to our bud-
gets, the full extent of which will not be known until 
later this summer. So perhaps we just made it under 
the wire?  Fortunately for us, the Atlantis grant has 
already provided the resources we needed to begin to 
drill down to the granular level that is stock-and-trade 
of the policy analyst.
 But, it is ironical indeed that this cut in US 
funding is being made at just the time that President 
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Obama has affirmed, in his highly successful—in dip-
lomatic and publicity terms at least—week long trip to 
Europe at the end of May, the importance of the trans-
atlantic relationship and of the two ‘sides’ promoting 
mutual understanding.  
Laurie Buonanno
State University of New York, Buffalo
Neill Nugent, Manchester Metropolitan University
 and College of Europe
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Transatlantic Policy Network
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EUSA members to the working group.  
4 See http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fipsecomp/applicant.
html.  Also, see (Wilhelm, 2011).
EUSA Review    Spring 2011  23 
Book Reviews
substitute for loss of natural capital (e.g., no water, no 
food). Yet the externalities imposed on the environment 
by human activities are ignored or outsourced. This is 
the tragedy of the commons, i.e., the privatization of 
benefits and the socialization and export of liabilities, 
which Green accounting counters through an expansive 
definition of the pollution and resource use cycle and 
the application of the “polluter pays” principle. Green 
accounting promotes the “product life cycle” approach 
from extraction to production to consumption to dis-
posal/destruction (Synthesis 69) and, we would add, 
transportation and distribution. If implemented, this 
revolutionary paradigm would further standardize ad-
ministrative, statistical, and reporting systems across 
Europe (Synthesis 162).
 Green accounting also requires “coherent 
analyses” across sectoral policies and “multiple policy 
targets” (Synthesis 10-11). It expects Europe to de-
velop a coherent, overarching approach through “joint 
policy formulation” whereby the environmental impact 
of its trade, energy, development aid, and defense 
policies — among others — is assessed and factored 
in the decision process. The best example of domestic 
implementation of this concept is the CAP, “the sectoral 
policy in the EU with the strongest influence in this re-
spect.” (Synthesis 50) Indeed, the CAP is a key driver of 
wasteful resource use (e.g., water), water contamination 
(through nutrients run offs), loss of natural habitat and 
viability for flora and fauna (e.g., bee colony collapse 
disorder), natural cover transformation and depletion 
(e.g., land clearing, deforestation, and associated loss 
of carbon trapping), excessive chemical use (e.g., her-
bicides, pesticides), public health crises (e.g., zoonosis 
such as mad cow disease), loss of biodiversity (e.g., 
monoculture, regional specialization, industrial farming), 
and adventuresome bioengineering (e.g., GMOs). In 
sum, the CAP is the cross-cutting policy par excellence 
that warrants “obligatory cross-compliance with envi-
ronmental legislation” to “ease agricultural pressures 
on the environment.” (Synthesis 60)
 Green accounting also considers the external 
outsourcing of environmental and resource use. One 
easily forgets that “Europe’s contribution to global emis-
sions could be greater if European imports of goods 
and services, with their ‘embedded carbon’, are taken 
into account” (Synthesis 28). Europe has shifted to the 
exporting countries the environmental burden “associ-
ated with the extraction and processing of many mate-
rials and natural resources” (Synthesis 69-70). Water 
is perhaps the most egregious example of a linchpin 
natural resource embedded in trade: “84% of the EU 
cotton-related water footprint, which is a measure for 
the total amount of water used to produce goods and 
services consumed — lies outside the EU, mostly in 
European Environmental Agency. The European 
Environment. State and Outlook: Synthesis  and The 
European Environment. State and Outlook: Assess-
ment of Global Megatrends. European Environmental 
Agency, Brussels, 2010. Multilingual PDFs: http://www.
eea.europa.eu/soer
 Every five years since 1990, the European 
Environmental Agency (EAA) publishes the State and 
Outlook Environment Report, its flagship study on the 
condition of, trends in, and prospects for Europe’s 
environment. Its fourth iteration, SOER 2010, is the 
most complete and up-to-date assessment of Europe’s 
environment and comprises four documents: 1) the-
matic assessments of key trends (e.g., climate change, 
biodiversity, land use, air pollution, etc.), 2) individual 
countries assessments, 3) a review of global trends 
relevant for Europe and, 4) a comprehensive synthesis 
of all three reports. Given the considerable overlap, 
only the last two reports (Global and Synthesis) are 
reviewed herein. The focus of SOER 2010 — climate 
change; nature and biodiversity; natural resources and 
waste; health and quality of life — echoes the priorities 
of the EU’s 6th Environment Action Program (2002-12) 
and its 2006 Strategy for Sustainable Development, 
thereby connecting today’s European environmental 
policies with deeper long-term research. And SOER 
2010’s scope is indeed ambitious since it considers 32 
EEA member countries plus six cooperating countries 
in the Western Balkans, and four regional seas, for a 
total of about 600 million people and 5.85 million km2 
(Synthesis 15).
 The wealth of the descriptive part of Synthesis 
— the state of Europe’s land, air, water, resource use, 
environment-related deaths, etc. — is impressive. Its 
area-by-area balance sheet is mixed at best and, be-
cause pressure on the environmental and resources is 
relentlessly increasing, depressing. Perhaps observers 
will find some comfort in the remedial “integrated ap-
proach” (159) SOER 2010 proposes. Its core proposal 
is a paradigmatic revolution away from the hegemonic, 
warped GDP discourse (Synthesis 161-67). The “natural 
capital” or “ecosystem services” (Synthesis 127) that 
we mistakenly take for granted underpin all other types 
of capital (human, social, manufactured and financial) 
“that hold together our societies and economies” (Syn-
thesis 158). Some natural ecoservices are replaceable, 
although with much effort (e.g., renewable energy in 
lieu of fossil fuels), but more often than not, there is no 
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water-scare region with intensive irrigation” (Synthesis 
87). The concept of “virtual water” (the invisible water 
that is indispensable for the life cycle of a product) is 
key here, although curiously SOER 2010 never men-
tions it. 
This kind of environmental truth and justice entails con-
troversial propositions: 1) in several important respects 
(disproportionate use of world resources and emission 
of GHGs), Northern developed countries with a histori-
cal head start bear a higher responsibility in the making 
of the global problem, 2) their responsibility, combined 
with their stronger capacity for action, imply a stronger 
burden in solving the issues and, 3) only through imagi-
native power sharing will such issues be addressed. 
Global (66-70) emphasizes this need for “inclusive 
governance” (Synthesis 115, 169) by disapprovingly 
mentioning the EU’s complicated institutional architec-
ture, which perpetuates disputes over competencies 
and hinders rapid and/or strategic action. Global also 
alludes to the international “messy multilateralism” (66) 
that frames Europe’s action: inclusive global regimes, 
functional regional cooperation, groupings of leading 
countries (G8, G20) around pressing issues, the in-
creasing use of innovative forms of policy coordination 
(soft law, guidelines, framework agreements, codes), 
the importance of non-state actors “and hybrid forms 
of public-private governance” for implementation, and 
finally the globalization of administrative law, technical 
norms and standards through, for instance, the ISO. 
Sadly, Global’s brief description does not segue into an 
overall assessment or innovative propositions. 
 In this complex web of institutions and prac-
tices, Green accounting would also require Europeans 
to identify and implement acceptable trade-offs among 
policy options in terms of their environmental impact 
and help spread international regulatory standards 
resembling their “own advanced standards” (Global 
69). Such a recommendation directly fuels the U.S. and 
BRIC’s suspicion that the EU wants to impose its Green 
preferences to undermine its competitors’ competitive-
ness. And indeed a policy orientation that integrates 
the environmental footprint as a linchpin across both 
domestic and international policies, especially trade, 
carries dramatic implications for policymaking and 
politics. This leads the Global report to stress the blur-
ring between Europe’s internal and external policies 
and the need to radically expand its notion of national 
security to include environmental factors (69-77).
 Clearly, SOER 2010 is systematic by virtue of 
the magnitude of its assessment and by its embedding 
of European environment within the global context. 
Europe impacts world environmental trends notably 
through its two-ways economic flows (imports and 
exports of labor, energy, raw materials, and manu-
factured goods), and its home economic activities. Its 
opportunities and challenges are increasingly shaped 
by multiple “global drivers” over which it has no control 
and that can be viewed through the STEEP (social, 
technological, economic, environmental and political) 
framework (Global 7, Synthesis 138-41). Thus Global 
analyses the implications for Europe of 11 of the most 
relevant global STEEP trends. For instance, the three 
key social megatrends (9-24) under STEEP are popula-
tion trends (aging of societies, slower global population 
growth, regional differences, and migrations), continu-
ous urbanization, and “disease burdens and the risk 
of new pandemics”. Economic megatrends (31-46) 
feature “continued economic growth”, the rise of mul-
tipolarity, BRIC economies and especially China, the 
relative economic decline of Europe, and “intensified 
competition for global resources”. As “Europe is rela-
tively resource-poor and needs to import much of the 
resources it requires,” (45) especially energy, the eco-
nomic implications of these “changing scarcity patterns” 
(39) for Europeans are worrisome. The environmental 
megatrends section (47-64) confirms such dire finding 
by stressing “decreasing stocks of natural resources” 
and the worsening consequences of climate change 
(based on the IPCC’s SRES A2 scenario), including 
drastic variations in precipitation, water resources, and 
agricultural productivity.
 SOER 2010 describes current and predicted 
environmental conditions at length, stresses the need 
for new paradigms, and articulates intriguing solutions 
— yet it shies away from proposing a systematic policy 
program. For example, Synthesis repeatedly mentions 
“spatial planning” as a positive approach yet fails to 
elaborate. Likewise, as Global describes technological 
megatrends (25-30), it gives scant developments to the 
solving capacities of the NBIC cluster: nanosciences 
and technologies, biotechnologies and life sciences, 
information and communication technologies, cognitive 
sciences and neurotechnologies. Finally, Synthesis 
leaves largely unexplained the “ancillary benefits” (44) 
of environmental trade-offs, mitigation and adaptation 
policies. For instance, the economic opportunities 
derived from innovative waste management and recy-
cling are duly recognized: “roughly 0.75% of EU GDP 
corresponds to waste management and recycling,” the 
“recycling industry has an estimated turnover of EUR 75 
billion and employs half a million persons,” the EU “has 
around […] 50% of the waste and recycling industries.” 
(73-75). Yet the upstream reduction of waste generation 
as an alternative to waste management — through, 
say, stricter regulation on biodegradable or reusable 
packaging, or a market-driven switch to bulk sales —is 
not discussed. In this instance, the mainstream “Rs” 
approach (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, Refuse) to waste 
EUSA Review    Spring 2011  25 
policy analysis has gone to waste.
 SOER 2010 differs from previous editions by 
its insistence on 1) our now compressed timeframe 
for action and “the speed at which interconnectedness 
spreads risks and increases uncertainties across the 
world” (Synthesis 152), 2) the growing consensus 
around linkages, direct and indirect, obvious and hid-
den, between environmental challenges and especially 
climate change as the key global driver of numerous 
environmental challenges, 3) the growing weight of 
global megatrends on Europe and, 4) the specific 
nature of environmental risks. This last point is espe-
cially germane for policy analysts since environmental 
policy dwells uncomfortably at the disputed intersection 
between objective Earth sciences and all-too-human 
policymaking. It is marked by the “existence of unknown, 
even unknowable, impacts” which “poses a great 
challenge to risk governance” (Synthesis 141) and by 
unforeseen linkages: environmental changes in one 
area may bring about others in unexpected areas (e.g., 
European predatory fishing practices leading to baboon 
invasions in Ghana’s villages). Environmental changes 
can be non-linear both in terms of the magnitude and 
the speed of change: a small catalyst may aggregate 
much deeper forces that unleash exponential changes 
(decoupling between immediate cause and cascading 
effects), which unfold faster than anticipated (the time 
horizon is compressed because of “tipping points” or 
abrupt systemic disruptions following an extended pe-
riod of cumulative changes) (Synthesis 147). 
 Overall, SOER 2010 is a treasure trove of data 
and analyses, and its countless graphs, tables, and 
statistical summaries make it an invaluable resource for 
classroom use. Together with other key sources — the 
Commission’s annual Environment Policy Reviews or 
its 2009 White Paper on Adapting to Climate Change 
— it offers a timely guide for action for policymakers, 
NGOs, OIs, citizens, and the private sector. 
Michel Gueldry
Monterey Institute of International Studies
 Hermann Schmitt (ed.). European Parliament Elec-
tions after Eastern Enlargement. New York: Routledge, 
2010. 
  With the Eastern enlargement, 8 post-commu-
nist states joined the European Union and brought with 
them two distinct elements: first, a public of ‘European-
minded citizens’, more supportive of the EU than 
people in other countries, who strongly identify with the 
European community (Scheuer and Schmitt); second, 
a distinct party system characterized by substantial 
levels of volatility and built mostly on issue alliances 
and charismatic leaders rather than upon socio-political 
cleavages. Considering the contextual heterogeneity of 
the EU, in terms of its publics and party systems, what 
can be said about the effects of this last enlargement 
on various aspects of the input legitimacy of European 
Union politics? 
 ‘What has changed?’ is then the leit-motif that 
runs through all scholarly contributions to this volume, 
question addressed from various research agendas 
previously developed on other EP electoral waves. 
Assembled in three sections, the edited chapters cover 
East-West attitudinal differences, the EU party system, 
and the electoral participation and vote choice. Given 
the distinctiveness of the starting point, the broad con-
clusion comes, to some extent, as a surprise: these 
analyses delineate empirically and analytically ‘the 
limited but visible impact’ of the enlargement. 
 As such, Garry and Tilley set up a pan-Euro-
pean model to disentangle the drivers of attitudes to 
European integration and convincingly conclude that 
national economic evaluations are a more powerful 
predictor of EU attitudes in the Eastern context than 
in the Western one. Schmitt and Thomassen focus 
on the distinct character of the post-communist party 
systems and the extent to which ‘they fit’ into the new 
environment of the EU party system. The authors find 
that the enlargement has done ‘surprisingly little’ to the 
structure of party competition, despite the fact that a 
substantive number of new members did not join one of 
the traditional EP groups. Still focused on the EU party 
system but less concerned with East-West differences, 
Van der Brug and Fennema ask whether European vot-
ers use different criteria to evaluate radical right parties 
than to evaluate other parties. Their major finding is that 
radical right supporters come from all different strata 
in society. Moreover, given the two-dimensional space 
of party competition the authors find that the left-right 
ideological dimension is the strongest determinant of 
electoral preferences, weaker for radical right-wing 
parties than for others. The European dimension, un-
derstood as the issue of European integration, exerts 
a similar effect on both party types. 
 The third section concerned with electoral par-
ticipation and party choice at EP elections brings new 
insights into the dynamics of political competition in a 
multilevel setting. With respect to turnout, citizens of 
the new member states are not reacting differently to 
EP elections than citizens of the ‘established’ members 
(Wessels and Franklin). Set up in terms of three deficits 
addressing the political community, the EU institutional 
system, and the mobilization efforts, the authors show 
that people’s perceptions of the uselessness of the EP 
vote matter the most for explaining turnout at individual 
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level. With respect to vote choice, Marsh points to EU at-
titudes as not relevant for vote switching but relevant for 
abstention, and to partisanship ‘as less of a constraint’ 
in the case of new member states. These results are 
somewhat confirmed by the more comprehensive study 
of Freire et al. who underscore the left-right ideologi-
cal dimension as the most relevant for party choice, 
dimension that is not ‘equally useful’ in consolidating 
democracies. Finally, Clark and Rohrschneider’s study 
addresses the differential impact of EU and national 
level motivations. As such, the electoral choice is influ-
enced ‘to a considerable extent’ by EU factors, while 
East-West differences are mostly ‘insignificant’.  
 In a nutshell, do the two distinct factors of the 
new member states matter for political competition at 
EP elections? Lacking a synthesizing chapter, one 
would answer, based on the presented contributions, 
it depends: first, on what needs to be explained, and 
second, on the methodological sophistication set up to 
capture the two distinct dimensions of multilevel gover-
nance. However, despite the limitations of sometimes 
conflictual claims, the volume represents a major con-
tribution to the growing research on the nature and the 
effects of EP elections.
Magda Giurcanu, University of Florida
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